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INTRODUCTION
The nexus between the court system (meaning in this note the civil-procedure
rules and conventions according to which a matter is litigated) and the
application of ss 4(1) and 4(7) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (‘PIE’) is the focus of this note.
These provisions require that a court considers all relevant circumstances
before an eviction order can be made. The need to explore this nexus became
apparent in the recent case of Pitje v Shibambo 2016 (4) BCLR 460 (CC) (‘Pitje
(CC)’). In this case, the Constitutional Court yet again referred an eviction
case back to the high court for re-adjudication after stating (para 19):
‘[C]ourts cannot necessarily restrict themselves to a passive role ... . [C]ourts are
obliged to probe and investigate the surrounding circumstances when an
eviction from a home is sought. This is particularly true when the prospective
evictee is vulnerable. These considerations would have enabled the High Court
to apply the requirements of PIE justly.’
The dictum forces us to re-evaluate the approach of the courts in eviction
cases. In this regard, the central question to this note is whether the court
system is required to, or has been changed to, ensure that all relevant
circumstances are considered by courts in the eviction context. An explora-
tion of this question is pivotal in determining whether the court system
might have an inhibiting or empowering effect on the courts’ ability to take
all relevant circumstances into account before making eviction orders.
Therefore, the ﬁrst part of this note will brieﬂy set out the eviction remedies
that were available to owners in the pre-constitutional and in the constitu-
tional era to contextualise the requirement of PIE that all relevant circum-
stances must be considered before an eviction order can be granted. The
second part investigates the procedural rules that regulated the court system
in the pre-constitutional era. It also expounds on the way in which these
procedural rules tended to impact on eviction cases. The ﬁnal part deter-
mines whether the Constitution has ushered in the necessary changes to the
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court system in the context of evictions. It also considers whether in Pitje and
similar cases the courts’ failure to apply the provisions of PIE justly in the
constitutional era can be ascribed (partly or wholly) to the nature of the
pre-constitutional court system. This note does not set out to provide
primary research for assessing how the courts in every PIE eviction case have
applied the provisions of PIE. Instead, a trend with regard to the way in
which courts applied PIE in speciﬁc cases is identiﬁed. This trend is then
connected to the constraints and scope of the procedural rules and conven-
tions applied in the cases that are discussed in this note.
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EVICTION REMEDIES FOR
UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS
In the pre-constitutional era a landowner who wished to evict an unlawful
occupier from her land had two remedies at her disposal, namely the
proprietary remedy (the rei vindicatio) and the apartheid statutory eviction
measure (the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1956) (‘PISA’) (see
Cornelius van der Merwe Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 346; Gustav Muller ‘The
legal-historical context of urban forced evictions in South Africa’ (2013) 19
Fundamina 386; Juanita Pienaar Land Reform (2014) 667). These remedies
operated in a rights paradigm where ownership was accepted as the strongest
right in the hierarchy of rights. Actions for evictions were relatively
uncomplicated due to the straight forward requirements of these causes of
action, and the landowners’ relatively strong rights vis-a-vis the weak
position of unlawful occupiers (Van derMerwe op cit at 350;A J van derWalt
Property in the Margins (2009) 53).
Section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996
ushered in a new approach to evictions (see also Sandra Liebenberg
Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010)
270; Pienaar op cit at 661; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005
(1) SA 217 (CC) para 11). Section 26(3) of the Constitution provides that:
‘No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished
without an order of court made after considering all relevant circumstances.
No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.’
Subsequent to the enactment of s 26(3), PIE was promulgated to replace
the pre-constitutional eviction remedies. PIE regulates the eviction of
unlawful occupiers occupying premises for residential purposes in the
constitutional dispensation (s 4(1) of PIE; Liebenberg op cit at 270; Pienaar
op cit at 688). This legislative measure caused a shift from a private-law
rights-based approach to eviction disputes, where ownership was key, to an
approach where interests other than ownership are considered before an
eviction order can be made. Section 4(6) of PIE embodies this shift. It states
that ‘a court may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just
and equitable to do so, after considering all the relevant circumstances,
including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and
households headed by women’. Section 4(7) of PIE repeats the same
sentiment, stating that
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‘[i]f an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than six
months at the time when the proceedings are initiated, a court may grant an
order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after
considering all the relevant circumstances, including, except where the land is
sold in a sale of execution pursuant to a mortgage, whether land has been made
available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality or other organ
of state or another land owner for the relocation of the unlawful occupier, and
including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and
households headed by women’.
The explicit reference and emphasis on the requirement to consider all
relevant circumstances in Pitje invites questions about how the court system
of civil procedure should be able to assist the court to ensure that this
requirement of PIE is met. Therefore, the section below considers the court
system of civil procedure according to which judges adjudicated cases in the
pre-constitutional and the constitutional era.
THE COURT SYSTEM IN THE PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL ERA
Basic principles
In the pre-constitutional era, before British occupation, the procedural rules
of the Roman-Dutch civil tradition found application in the South African
legal system. This meant that the court system was primarily inquisitorial
(Hennie Erasmus ‘The interaction of substantive law and procedure’ in
Reinhard Zimmerman & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and
Common Law in South Africa (1996) 145).
The inquisitorial nature of the procedural rules and court proceedings placed
the presiding ofﬁcer in a managerial role with regard to all aspects of trials.
However, after British occupation, English procedural rules, principles and
practices were incorporated into South African law and replaced the Roman-
Dutch procedural rules (Erasmus op cit at 146). The English procedural law
dictated all relevant factors, including the role of courts, the hierarchy of courts,
and the scope of the powers and jurisdiction of the courts (ibid). The most
pertinent characteristic of the common-law tradition that the SouthAfrican legal
system inherited in the sphere of procedural law was the adversarial approach to
court proceedings. The common-law adversarial approach differs from the
inquisitorial approach. The inquisitorial nature of the civil-law tradition requires
judges to take up an active role in court proceedings while the adversarial court
system requires judges to refrain from interfering with the court proceedings
(John Jolowicz ‘Adversarial and inquisitorialmodels of civil procedure’(2003) 52
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 290). Both private-law and statutory
eviction remedies in the pre-constitutional era were dealt with within the
adversarial procedural framework.
The adversarial system of civil procedure is premised on three basic
assumptions, namely (a) that disputes between parties are private matters;
(b) that the parties are in the best position to plead and argue their cases;
and (c) that intervention by the court is not needed (Estelle Hurter ‘Seeking
truth or seeking justice: Reﬂections on the changing face of the adversarial
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process in civil litigation’ 2007 TSAR 242). These basic assumptions
developed the unique features of the adversarial system of civil procedure,
namely (a) that oral evidence and cross examination are two integral elements
of a trial; (b) that the parties in dispute bring and argue their own cases; and
(c) that the adjudicator is required to make a ﬁnal and binding decision after
considering the evidentiary material in a passive, objective and rational
manner (P J Schwikkard & S E van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed
(2002) 9; Deon Erasmus & Angus Hornigold ‘Court supervised institutional
transformation in South Africa’(2015) 18 PER 2457; Hennie Erasmus
‘Historical foundations of the South African law of civil procedure’ (1991)
108 SALJ 265). In other words, the parties in a dispute decide upon the relief
they prefer and the legal rules, facts and arguments upon which they wish to
rely to obtain the relief sought. This feature of the adversarial system of civil
procedure is also known as party control (Constantine Theophilopoulos,
Corlia van Heerden &Andre Boraine Fundamental Principles of Civil Procedure
2 ed (2012) 3; Hurter op cit at 242). The court was conﬁned to the issues as
framed by the parties in their pleadings and could not deviate from the
pleadings. Hurter explains that the adjudicator plays a passive role in
adversarial proceedings because it lacks investigative powers (ibid at 243).
Therefore, in the pre-constitutional era courts were generally restricted to
the issues as framed in the pleadings of the parties, and were required to take
up a passive role. The sub-part below explores the impact of the courts’
passive role in court proceedings in eviction cases.
Case law
The implications of the adversarial court system in the eviction context are
clearly illustrated in Khuzwayo v Dludla 2001 (1) SA 714 (LCC)
(‘Khuzwayo’). Khuzwayowas decided in the constitutional era. However, it is
signiﬁcant for purposes of this discussion because it highlights the way in
which the court perceived its role in eviction cases in the pre-constitutional
era. The power of the Land Claims Court in Khuzwayo was limited in so far
as the parties failed to rely on the applicable legislative measure in their
pleadings that would allow them a review of the eviction order granted
against them in the Melmoth magistrate’s court (Khuzwayo ibid para 1). The
court held on the basis of Skhosana & others v Roos t/a Roos SE Oord & others
2000 (4) SA 561 (LCC) that it would only have jurisdiction in the matter if
the occupiers raised a defence against the eviction in terms of the Extension
of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (‘ESTA’) (Khuzwayo (supra) para 10;
Skhosana (supra) para 22). In the court a quo the plaintiff’s cause of action was
the common-law rei vindicatio, and the defence raised by the defendants was
lawful occupation of the property (Khuzwayo (supra) paras 1–4). Based on the
pleadings, the court found that the occupiers had raised no defence in terms
of ESTA and that it therefore had no automatic review jurisdiction (ibid para
12). The court emphasised that in terms of the adversarial system which
regulates the role of presiding ofﬁcers, it is not the duty of courts to read in
defences for parties where they themselves had failed to raise the defence.
NOTES 435
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
Interestingly, the court observed that such an approach leaves those occupiers
that ESTA and PIE purport to protect without protection and therefore
vulnerable to eviction (ibid para 13). Despite recognising this gap, the court
nevertheless rejected the application for review, based on its professed limited
powers in this regard (ibid).
Similarly, in Betta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 (W),
Flemming JA expressed strong statements regarding the role of the court in
eviction cases (ibid para 15). He emphasised that the court’s role is not to look
for defences for parties where they do not expressly raise such defences. He
held that the phrase ‘all circumstances’ in terms of s 26(3) of the Constitution
only applies to those circumstances included in the pleadings (ibid).A court is
accordingly obliged only to refer to the defences raised in the pleadings in
s 26(3) cases (ibid). Therefore, there is no duty on courts to go beyond the
pleadings of the parties.
These cases illustrate the way in which courts before and around the turn
of the century understood their role when applying eviction remedies. They
also illustrate the fact that the passive approach of the courts led them to make
decisions in a mechanical manner, even after it became clear that granting an
eviction order would potentially be unjust in the circumstances. In view of
these ﬁndings, the next part of this note explores the nature of the court
system in the context of evictions in the constitutional era in light of the
Constitution and the new eviction legislation.
THE COURT SYSTEM IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA
Basic principles
With the advent of the Constitution the adversarial approach to court
proceedings for the most part remained unchanged. However, the case law
subsequent to those decisions referred to in the previous part of this note
relating to s 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE has indicated that the
traditional adversarial court system applied in the pre-constitutional era, with
its deferent approach to the parties’ pleadings, might not be the most suitable
court system in the eviction context because of the just and equitable
requirement in PIE (ss 4(6), 4(7), 4(8), 6(1) and 6(3) of PIE).
The promulgation of PIE made justice and equity the standard for
evictions of unlawful occupiers. Courts are enjoined to grant eviction orders
only when they are satisﬁed that it would be just and equitable in a particular
case to do so (ss 4(6) and 4(7) of PIE). This requirement was considered
authoritatively in 2004 in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005
(1) SA 217 (CC) (‘PE Municipality’). In PE Municipality Sachs J explained
what just and equitable means in the eviction context by highlighting the
complex diametrical fundamental needs and interests it regulates (ibid para
33). PIE aims to ensure that equilibrium can be reached between the
opposing interests in the case, namely the plight of the homeless on the one
hand, and the property rights of owners, on the other. He explained that
these rights are entrenched in ss 26(3) and 25 of the Constitution, respec-
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tively. The eviction process under the constitutional order essentially
provides a process for the orderly removal of informal settlements (ibid).
However, PIE cannot ensure the orderly resettlement of occupiers if it is
applied in a legalistic, mechanical fashion because every resettlement is
unique and would require a unique arrangement to ensure that the removal is
fair and orderly. Accordingly, PIE essentially requires that courts apply its
provisions in such a way that will ensure that the outcomes in eviction cases
are always just and equitable for all concerned (ibid). The court in
PE Municipality went on to emphasise that the granting of an eviction order
would not be just and equitable for purposes of PIE if it only took one of the
parties’ circumstances into consideration (ibid). Justice and equity therefore
require the court to follow a context-sensitive and balanced approach
pertaining to all parties involved and all factors relevant to the inquiry (ibid
para 35).
The recent Constitutional Court case of Occupiers of Erven 87 & Berea v
De Wet NO & another 2017 (5) SA346 (CC) (‘Berea’) reafﬁrmed this duty, and
indicated that the scope of the obligation on courts to ensure just and
equitable evictions also covers those instances where the occupiers purport-
edly consented to their eviction (ibid paras 52–3). The Constitutional Court
held that even where courts are furnished with settlement agreements, their
constitutional duty remains to investigate the relevant circumstances in order
to ensure that evictions are just and equitable (ibid para 54). In such cases
judicial oversight is required in eviction orders because people might consent
even though they are not fully aware of their rights or the implications of that
to which they are consenting (ibid para 17).
Academic literature underscores the signiﬁcance of the context-sensitive
exercise courts must engage in when confronted with an eviction application
in terms of PIE. Liebenberg argues that one of the novel implications of the
PE Municipality judgment is that it explains the particular constitutional
responsibility on courts to strive for a just and equitable solution. Such a
solution should be aimed at reconciling the interests of landowners and
unlawful occupiers by way of a constitutional, historical and context-
sensitive analysis. In this regard, Liebenberg points out that this new
constitutional responsibility on the court furnishes the court with a ‘broad
and expansive’ discretion to grant or dismiss an eviction application on the
basis of justice and equity (Liebenberg op cit at 278). This discretion is not
limited to the substantive question of what would be just and equitable in a
particular case. It also extends to procedural aspects of adjudication. Here, she
refers to the courts’ entitlement ‘to go beyond the facts established on the
papers before it, and play a more inquisitorial role in procuring ‘‘ways of
establishing the true state of affairs, so as to enable it to ‘have regard’ to
relevant circumstances’’ ’ as envisioned in PE Municipality (ibid).
Similarly, Pienaar observes that ‘a rather broad discretion exists for courts
to ﬁnd whether the granting of the eviction order would be just and
equitable’ (Pienaar op cit at 761). She explains that this broad discretion is
aimed at ensuring that both interests and all other relevant factors pertaining
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to the applicants’ and respondents’ position are considered by the court. She
stresses the importance of the courts’ duty to take account of all relevant
circumstances by stating that ‘[a]ll necessary information has to be before the
court, which may include [amongst other things] joining additional parties
to effect that, in order for courts to reach a just and equitable conclusion’ (ibid
at 761).
An interesting question that arises with regard to the just and equitable
requirement and the fact that all relevant circumstances should be consid-
ered, is what happens when both parties fail to furnish the court with all the
relevant circumstances? Do ‘all relevant circumstances’ refer only to those
circumstances that are included in the parties’ pleadings, or can it refer to
further relevant circumstances not included in the parties’ pleadings? Further-
more, if the latter is the case, is there any obligation on courts to ensure that
they are furnished with all relevant circumstances, and if so, how do we
explain the operation of the adversarial court system within this proactive
framework required by PIE in eviction proceedings?
With regard to the ﬁrst question, namely whether all relevant circum-
stances in a case refer to those circumstances stipulated in the pleadings of the
parties, Sachs J in PE Municipality ((supra) para 30) provides a starting point to
answering this question:
‘There is nothing in section 6 [of PIE] to suggest that the three speciﬁcally
identiﬁed circumstances are intended to be the only ones to which the court
may refer in deciding what is just and equitable. They are peremptory but not
exhaustive. It is clear both from the open ended way in which they are framed
and from the width of decision making involved in the concept of what is just
and equitable, that the court has a very wide mandate and must give due
consideration to all circumstances that might be relevant. Thus the particular
vulnerability of occupiers referred to in section 4 (the elderly, children, disabled
persons and households headed by women) could constitute a relevant
circumstance under section 6.’
From this passage it is clear that all relevant circumstances refer to the list of
factors in ss 4 and 6 of PIE. However, the court makes it even clearer that the
inquiry into all relevant circumstances is not limited to the listed factors. In
other words, courts are called upon to consider the circumstances relevant to
the speciﬁc case before it, above and beyond the speciﬁc factors highlighted
in PIE. This generous interpretation of ‘all relevant circumstances’ has been
followed in subsequent cases, and has been welcomed by a number of
scholars (Transnet Ltd v Nyawua & others 2006 (5) SA 100 (D) at 107; Thutha v
Thutha & another [2010] ZAECMHC 2 para 8; Arendse v Arendse 2013 (3) SA
347 (C) para 33; Mahogany Ridge 2 Property Owners’ Association v Unlawful
Occupiers of Lot 13113 Pinetown & others [2013] 2 All SA 236 (KZD) paras
51–3; Berea (supra) paras 39–50; Liebenberg op cit at 270; Pienaar op cit at
773).
Furthermore, the court in PE Municipality indicated that courts have wide
powers with regard to the just-and-equitable requirement, and that these
wide powers extend to the courts’ ability to consider circumstances that
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‘might be relevant’ in a particular case (PE Municipality (supra) para 30). This
indicates that courts have the power to consider all relevant circumstances
that on the facts of the case might be relevant, even if it is a factor that was not
speciﬁcally pleaded by any of the parties. The ratio of the court in Occupiers of
Erf 101, 102, 104 and 112, Shorts Retreat, Pietermaritzburg v Daisy Dear
Investments & others 2009 (4) All SA 410 (SCA) (‘Daisy Dear Investments’)
conﬁrms such a generous interpretation of the role of the court in eviction
cases. An eviction order granted by the high court against 2000 unlawful
occupiers was set aside by the SCA in Daisy Dear Investments on the basis that
the court a quo failed mero motu to join the municipality to the proceedings
as an interested party. Jafta JAheld (paras 13–14):
‘It seems to me that had the court below not fallen into error in determining
whether the order it contemplated was just and equitable to both sides, it could
have insisted upon joinder of the municipality. ... The municipality’s position in
eviction proceedings under PIE differs from that of a third party in ordinary
litigation because it has constitutional obligations it must discharge in favour of
people facing eviction. It should therefore not be open to it to choose not to be
involved. Moreover, s 4 of PIE obliges the courts to be innovative and if it
becomes necessary, to depart from the conventional approach.’
Here the court highlighted not only the important role that local
government has to fulﬁl in eviction cases, but also stressed the crucial role
courts have to play. This dictum shows that courts have to ensure that they
are furnished with all relevant circumstances. This is why they have wide
powers to join interested parties and to call for more relevant factors to be
placed before them where the parties fail to do what the court considers
necessary in the circumstances. The recent Constitutional Court case of Pitje
(CC) is an example of a case where the court went beyond the speciﬁc factors
pleaded by the parties before it. The Constitutional Court highlighted the
fact that the appellant was elderly and in ill-health — something which was
not initially placed before the court — and that this needed to be taken into
account to satisfy the provisions of PIE. This factor was not raised to show
good cause for rescission purposes in the court a quo (Shibambo & others v Pitje
[2014] ZAGPPHC 501 (7 March 2014) paras 11–12). However, this did not
stop the Constitutional Court from recognising that these factors are
important for the purposes of determining whether it would be just and
equitable to grant an eviction order in the particular case. The court stressed
that these circumstances ought to be considered together with the homeless-
ness factor expressly pleaded by the appellant (see Pitje (CC) (supra) paras
18–19).
The remaining question is how this transformed role of the court ﬁts into
the framework of the traditional adversarial court system of civil procedure.
In Ross v South Peninsula Municipality 2000 (1) SA 589 (C) the court
considered the appropriateness of the adversarial court system in the
constitutional eviction paradigm. In the pleadings the plaintiff proffered that
she was the owner of the property and that Mrs Ross and all the other persons
occupying the property under her had no legal basis to occupy the property
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(ibid at 591). Due to the fact that PIE was not in force at that time, the
plaintiff relied on the rei vindicatio (ibid at 596). The respondent argued that
s 26(3) applied to the dispute, and insisted that all relevant circumstances be
considered by the court. Subsequently, the primary focus of the court was to
determine whether s 26(3) of the Constitution changed the onus of proof for
cases involving the rei vindicatio as set out in Graham v Ridley 1931 TPD 476
(ibid at 592). However, during this investigation the court pronounced on
the relationship between the adversarial court system and s 26(3) of the
Constitution (ibid at 595–6). The court highlighted the difference between
the adversarial and inquisitorial court systems and the way in which both
systems can accommodate the constitutional requirement for evictions,
namely that all relevant circumstances must be considered. It explained that
in inquisitorial proceedings the judicial ofﬁcer is at liberty to call for and
collect relevant information herself, while the adversarial process requires the
parties to a dispute to place the relevant circumstances before the court (ibid).
Ultimately, the court observed that s 26(3) endorses the adversarial court
procedure because it is possible for the parties to bring to court all the
relevant circumstances (ibid at 596). However, it also indicated that the court
may presumably have to call for ampliﬁcation in certain circumstances, after
the parties have placed factors they consider relevant before it (ibid).
Similarly, in the landmark eviction case PE Municipality the Constitutional
Court highlighted the important role presiding ofﬁcers have to play in the
procurement of all relevant circumstances. Sachs J (PE Municipality (supra)
para 32; see also the recent case of Pitje (CC) (supra) para 19) stressed that:
‘The obligation on the court is to ‘‘have regard to’’ the circumstances, that is, to
give them due weight in making its judgment as to what is just and equitable.
The court cannot fulﬁl its responsibilities in this respect if it does not have the
requisite information at its disposal. It needs to be fully apprised of the
circumstances before it can have regard to them. It follows that although it is
incumbent on the interested parties to make all relevant information available,
technical questions relating to onus of proof should not play an unduly
signiﬁcant role in its enquiry. ... Both the language of the section and the
purpose of the statute require the court to ensure that it is fully informed before
undertaking the onerous and delicate task entrusted to it. In securing the
necessary information, the court would therefore be entitled to go beyond the
facts established in the papers before it. Indeed when the evidence submitted by
the parties leaves important questions of fact obscure, contested or uncertain,
the court might be obliged to procure ways of establishing the true state of
affairs, so as to enable it properly to ‘‘have regard’’ to relevant circumstances.’
This dictum of the Constitutional Court afﬁrms the operation of the
adversarial court system. That means that, generally speaking, the parties are
in the best position to furnish the court with the relevant circumstances it
needs to make a just and equitable order. However, when the parties fail to
provide all the relevant circumstances, courts are enjoined to procure such
information (see also Berea (supra) para 47).
Clearly, the court system required by the constitutional eviction paradigm
does not completely ﬁt into the framework of the traditional adversarial
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approach. Instead, it requires that the adversarial court system is followed as a
starting point. However, where the parties fail adequately to procure and
furnish the court with the relevant circumstances, a more inquisitorial
approach is triggered. In this regard, the court must take up an investigative
and managerial role to ensure that justice and equity prevail. As a result,
courts can no longer in the face of an injustice merely state that they are
obliged only to have regard to the pleadings of the parties, as was the case in
Khuzwayo (supra). They are now required to ensure that justice and equity
prevail in eviction cases irrespective of any shortcomings of the pleadings.
The application of PIE requires a context-sensitive and proactive approach
where the boundaries of the adversarial court system fail to provide for the
purposes of s 26(3) and PIE.
Evaluation of case law
The above discussion of the required court system in the context of evictions
illustrates that a clear mandate exists as far as their involvement in eviction
proceedings is concerned. However, recent case law has indicated that courts
sometimes (a) fail to apply PIE when they should; or (b) fail to have regard to
all relevant circumstances when they do apply PIE. In this part of the note,
these recent cases are analysed to determine whether these failures could be
ascribed to the traditional adversarial approach entrenched in the traditional
legal culture of the courts.
Machele & others v Mailula & others 2010 (2) SA 275 (CC) (‘Machele’) and
Shibambo & others v Pitje [2015] ZAGPPHC 89 (‘Shibambo’) are the ﬁrst cases
in which the failure of the courts is addressed. Both cases resulted in appeals
to the Constitutional Court after the relevant high courts ordered the
eviction of the unlawful occupiers without having regard to the provisions of
PIE (Machele (supra) para 13; Shibambo (supra) para 1). In Machele the high
court had to decide on two applications, namely (a) the setting aside of the
sale of the concerned property on the basis of it being invalid, and (b) in the
event that the court dismissed the ﬁrst application, the court had to consider
the eviction of the occupiers of the concerned property (Philani-Ma-Africa &
others v Mailula & others, Mailula v Machele & others [2008] ZAGPHC 446 para
61; Machele (supra) paras 9–11; Philani-Ma-Africa & others v Mailula & others
2010 (2) SA 573 (SCA) para 5). The high court approached the two
applications as if they were one by granting the eviction as a necessary
consequence of the ﬁnding that the sale was invalid (Machele (supra) para 13;
Philani-Ma-Africa (supra) para 5). The Constitutional Court pronounced its
dismay of the high court’s complete disregard of PIE by stating (Machele
(supra) para 14–16):
‘The application of PIE is not discretionary. Courts must consider PIE in
eviction cases. PIE was enacted by Parliament to ensure fairness in and
legitimacy of eviction proceedings and to set out factors to be taken into
account by a court when considering the grant of an eviction order. Given that
evictions naturally entail conﬂicting constitutional rights, these factors are of
great assistance to courts in reaching constitutionally appropriate decisions.
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That the High Court authorised the eviction without having regard to the
provisions of PIE is inexcusable. PIE is of great importance, given that there are
still millions of people in our country without shelter or adequate housing and
who are vulnerable to arbitrary evictions.’
Similarly, in Pitje the high court ordered the eviction of the unlawful
occupier after ﬁnding that the occupier failed to prove ownership of the
premises (Pitje (CC) (supra) paras 9–12). The court made an eviction order a
natural consequence of unlawful occupation without having regard to all the
relevant circumstances. This does not mean that an eviction order may never
be granted; rather it emphasises that an eviction order may only be granted
once all the requirements of PIE have been met, in order to ensure a just and
equitable court order.
The failure of the courts to consider the provisions of PIE in both cases
could be ascribed to the fact that the applicants failed to bring the application
in terms of the provisions of PIE, and the respondents in turn failed to raise
PIE as defence. However, in the constitutional dispensation the mere fact
that the parties failed to raise PIE does not exclude its application. Instead, it
triggers the duty on the court to take up an inquisitorial role and to raise the
provisions of PIE mero motu. It therefore can be argued that by remaining
passive where they should have taken up an active role, the courts followed
the conventions and rules of the adversarial court system. The result was that
the courts failed in their legal responsibility to apply the provisions of PIE.
The second group of cases includes Vorster v Van Niekerk & others [2009]
ZAFSHC 9 (‘Vorster’); Daisy Dear Investments (supra); Arendse (supra) and
Berea (supra). In these cases, PIE was applied, but the courts failed to have
regard to all relevant circumstances.
In Vorster, the owner of a house sought the eviction of two elderly persons
aged 92 and 83 (Vorster (supra) para 11). The owner relied on s 4 of PIE for
the eviction application (ibid para 9). The unlawful occupiers based their
defence on an alleged usufruct that the applicant owner agreed to at the time
the occupiers moved into the house (ibid para 5). However, the court found
that no such usufruct existed. The court had to determine whether the
eviction of the respondents in this case would be just and equitable in terms of
PIE, as no legal basis existed for their occupation (ibid para 12). Section 4(7)
enjoins the court to take the interests and needs of the elderly into account
(ibid). The court held that because the occupiers were elderly persons, it
would not be just and equitable to grant an eviction order against them (ibid).
Accordingly, the eviction order was denied on the basis that the occupiers
were elderly, in line with s 4(2) of PIE.
The requirement that courts may only grant an eviction order if it is just
and equitable to do so requires, as has repeatedly been indicated, that the
court take all relevant circumstances into account when exercising its
discretion to grant or refuse an eviction order (ss 4(6) and 4(7); see further PE
Municipality supra para 23; A J van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 3 ed
(2011) 525). It is questionable whether the court in Vorster took all relevant
circumstances into account. It identiﬁed the importance of considering the
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elderly status of the respondents, but failed to inquire further as to the
respondents’ ﬁnancial ability to afford accommodation in an old-age home,
or the possibility that the respondents may have other relatives who might be
capable of providing accommodation. It is not sufﬁcient to consider one
factor alone in an eviction case. The court has a duty to probe for more
information before deciding to refuse to grant an eviction order based on one
factor. In the process the court failed to undertake a proper balancing
exercise, as is required in this context. Where a court does not consider all
relevant circumstances, the consequences are, ﬁrst, that the outcome will not
be just and equitable and, secondly, that it will undoubtedly result in
non-compliance with the provisions of PIE. In light of the above, the
approach followed by the court can also be described as passive and
mechanical, because the court failed to take up an inquisitorial role in
considering whether the parties had indeed furnished it with all the relevant
circumstances.
Daisy Dear Investments was a case in which a private landowner sought to
evict about 2000 unlawful occupiers in terms of PIE (Daisy Dear Investments
(supra) para 3). The eviction application was sought as a result of a demand
from the Msunduzi Municipality for the owner to evict the occupiers (ibid
para 4). The occupiers comprised a large community, and most of the
occupiers had occupied the land for more than ﬁve years (ibid). Furthermore,
the community consisted of poor and unemployed people, with households
that were mostly headed by women (ibid para 3). The high court had to
determine whether, in the circumstances of the case, an order in favour of
eviction would be just and equitable. The court in this case ordered the
eviction of the unlawful occupiers without having due regard to the
provisions of PIE. What becomes apparent from the decision in this case is
the crucial role courts need to play in making sure that an eviction order is
only ordered if it is genuinely just and equitable to do so. The court did not
ensure that it had all the factors relevant to the case placed before it. It also
failed to ascertain why it was not furnished with the relevant information, so
that it could be in a position to determine whether it must order the parties to
bring such evidence (ibid para 6). Furthermore, the court did not consider
the availability of alternative land for relocation purposes, and it appears too
easily to have accepted the Municipality’s report to be sufﬁcient information
regarding the unlawful occupiers (ibid para 7). The court also did not
consider whether mediation could have resolved the dispute (ibid para 9).
The court’s approach in Daisy Dear Investments exempliﬁes the traditional
adversarial approach to court proceedings because the court failed to manage
the proceedings in a proactive manner after the parties themselves had failed
to provide it with adequate and sufﬁcient information to ensure a just and
equitable order.
In Arendse the court reviewed an order granted by the court a quo for the
eviction of a disabled mother and her four minor children (Arendse (supra)
para 1). The court a quo had ordered the eviction of the respondent on the
basis of an allegation made by the applicant that the respondent was able to
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obtain suitable alternative accommodation due to the fact that she received a
disability pension/provident-fund pay-out (ibid para 18). Meer J pointed out
that the court a quo had erred in granting the order without further probing
for more information (ibid paras 35–6):
‘The enquiry conducted by the court a quo in my view fell short by far of the
standards prescribed in the aforementioned cases and prescribed in s 4(6) and
(7). From the evidence before the second respondent it was clear that the order
sought involved an eviction of children by their father, and a woman who,
according to the medical evidence, suffered from ‘‘bipolar mood disorder
secondary stroke, following a sub-arachnoidal bleeding on the right side of her
brain ...’’ and a household headed by such a woman. Yet the second respondent
did not consider the rights and needs of the children, disabled applicant and the
woman headed household, as he was speciﬁcally enjoined to do by s 4(6) and
(7) of PIE. Nor did he consider whether alternative accommodation was
available to them, a highly relevant consideration in all the circumstances. ...
Without considering the rights and needs of the applicant and her children the
second respondent could not have formed the opinion that it was just and
equitable to evict them.’
Similarly, in Berea the Constitutional Court was tasked with reviewing the
eviction order granted against the low-income and unemployed occupiers of
the Kiribilly Berea ﬂats in Johannesburg, of whom half were women and
children (Berea (supra) para 3). The high court had ordered the eviction after
it was furnished with a settlement agreement in which the occupiers had
ostensibly agreed to their eviction. Subsequently, the occupiers appealed the
eviction order on the basis that (i) no actual consent existed at the time the
order was granted, and (ii) that even if there had been consent, the court still
had a duty to take into consideration all the relevant circumstances in order
to ensure that their eviction would be just and equitable (ibid para 2). In Berea
the Constitutional Court was at pains to point out that courts are enjoined to
consider all relevant circumstances, and therefore cannot assume a passive
role in the eviction process (ibid paras 47, 52 and 53). The starting point in
terms of the duties of courts in this context is that courts must be informed of
the considerations that would make it just and equitable to grant the eviction
order, and if it is not informed of such considerations, a court enquiry cannot
be conducted, and an order cannot be made (ibid paras 46, 51 and 54). In this
regard, courts must be proactive in establishing all the facts that are relevant
to a case. The Constitutional Court found that the high court in this
particular matter took a passive approach by assuming there was consent, and
that the court therefore abrogated its responsibility to determine actively
whether an eviction would be just and equitable.
The circumstances in the Vorster, Daisy Dear Investment, Arendse and Berea
cases required the respective courts to go beyond the adversarial framework
in order to secure a just and equitable outcome, especially because the
respective eviction applications involved the most vulnerable groups of
people (disabled persons, minor children, elderly people and woman-headed
households). Instead, these courts (speciﬁcally those of ﬁrst instance) adopted
a passive role, and in so doing, failed to procure all relevant information.
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These cases illustrate that in eviction cases in particular, some courts are
still ensconced in the traditional adversarial frame of mind, and adopt the
view that the matter should be decided on the basis only of what is presented
to the court by the parties. The consequence is that they sometimes fail to
recognise when parties should have relied on PIE to resist an unlawful
eviction application from their homes, and even when they do apply PIE
they also sometimes fail to recognise that they have not been furnished with
all relevant circumstances in order to make a just and equitable order. Of
course, our argument is not that the adjudication of eviction disputes within
the adversarial framework is always the reason why courts fail to apply PIE
properly. Instead, the argument is rather that some of the failures, as illustrated
by the cases discussed in this note, can be ascribed to the adjudication of
eviction cases in a passive or adversarial, rather than a proactive or more
inquisitorial, manner.
CONCLUSION
This note shows that s 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE require courts to
break away from the traditional manner of adjudicating eviction cases. In the
pre-constitutional era courts were restricted to a passive role in court
proceedings, due to the operation of the traditional adversarial court system.
However, it is clear that this could no longer continue to be so in the
constitutional era. The Constitution and PIE require courts, where it is
necessary to do so, mero motu to go beyond the pleadings of the parties, to
order joinder of interested parties, and call upon parties to lead further
evidence of relevant factors.
This role is directly linked to the ‘just and equitable’ requirement in PIE.
Case law and academic commentary underscores the importance of an
inquisitorial court in eviction matters in order to safeguard the objectives of
s 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE. Courts can only make a just and
equitable order if they are furnished with all relevant circumstances in the
cases before them. Accordingly, courts are sometimes obliged to take up a
more managerial and inquisitorial role to ensure compliance with the
requirements of PIE.
We do accept that the traditional approach is still capable of ensuring that
courts make just and equitable orders when the parties in eviction applica-
tions plead their cases correctly and furnish courts with all relevant circum-
stances. However, where party control fails to ensure the advancement of
s 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE, the obligation that is placed on courts
to manage the proceedings in a more inquisitorial manner is triggered. The
cases that are discussed in this note indicate that, despite s 26(3) of the
Constitution and PIE having been part of our law for twenty years and more,
it remains the case that sometimes courts fail to take up an inquisitorial role
when the parties fail to furnish them with the appropriate cause of action on
the one hand, and all the relevant circumstances, on the other hand. The
courts’ failure in this regard can, we argue, be attributed to the pervasive
NOTES 445
© Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd
impact of the traditional adversarial court system that applies in civil disputes
generally. The adversarial court system clearly still forms part of the legal
culture of the courts in the constitutional dispensation, despite longstanding
legal injunctions to the contrary in the case of eviction disputes in particular.
This has dire consequences for the transformative thrust of the Constitution
in the context of evictions, because the failure of the courts to ensure just and
equitable outcomes in eviction cases results in some eviction orders being
granted against unlawful occupiers outside of the constitutional framework.
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